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BROKEN TAILLIGHT AT SEA:
THE PEACETIME INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
VISIT, BOARD, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
Commander James Kraska, JAGC, USN∗

I. INTRODUCTION—NORMS AND REGIMES FOR SHIP BOARDING IN
PEACETIME
Globalization and the rapid expansion in international trade over the
past twenty years were made possible only by growth in international
maritime shipping.1 International merchant shipping is the lifeblood of
the global economy, assimilating nations economically and serving as the
principal catalyst for the political and cultural phenomenon of
globalization. In recent decades, the world’s marine transportation
system has grown exponentially, accelerating interstate and
transcontinental integration. As the number of container cargo ships,
bulk carriers, and tanker vessels has increased, port facilities on every
continent have expanded rapidly to accommodate additional maritime
∗ Commander James Kraska holds the Howard S. Levie Chair of Operational Law,
and is a faculty member of the International Law Department and senior associate in the
Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups at the U.S. Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island. He also serves as a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research
Institute and as a guest investigator at the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution. This Article is derived from materials prepared for his Naval
War College advanced seminar, Global Maritime Security Law, which is the first course
of its kind in the United States. Commander Kraska is completing a book on maritime
piracy for Praeger Security International, an edited volume on Arctic security for
Cambridge University Press, and his study, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea, is
published by Oxford University Press. Commander Kraska was awarded the 2010 Alfred
Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement by the Navy League of the United
States. He may be reached at James.Kraska@gmail.com. The views presented are those
of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy or the
Department of Defense.
1. See MARC LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER (2006) (proposing that globalization was
made possible by the advent of the shipping container).
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traffic. With international merchant shipping now playing a central role
in joining together nations and continents commercially and politically,
the system has become more vulnerable to misuse or attack.
As the world marine transportation system has grown in importance,
it has become a more attractive vector for militants, terrorists,
international criminal organizations, and armed groups.2 Parasitic groups
mask illicit activities throughout the marine cargo chain infrastructure, or
exploit the system as part of a strategy of asymmetric warfare against
prosperous and democratic states. Regional ethnic and clan-based pirates,
extremists, and separatist and freelancing smugglers infect the marine
transportation system for political, economic, and military purposes.
Leveraging the anonymity afforded by the vast tyranny of time and
distance in the oceans, the resulting lawlessness destabilizes nations on
every continent.
To counter these threats, maritime law enforcement, coast guards,
and naval forces conduct constabulary patrols and maritime security
operations (MSO). States employ warships and law enforcement vessels,
as well as submarines and aircraft, to patrol the ocean commons,
particularly throughout the coastal zone. Ideally, threats can be disrupted
on the land, before they manifest an immediate danger, or along the seashore interface in port facilities, roadsteads, and inshore waters. It is
more practical, and often easier, to respond to threats on land than it is at
sea, as authorities on land can more quickly coordinate and bring to bear
against a threat a wider variety of intelligence assets and security forces.
For this purpose, nations operating port facilities may condition entry of
port by foreign-flagged vessels on compliance with certain port state
safety, security, environmental measures, and inspection regimes.
Searching a large ship at sea is impossible—containers cannot be
moved about deck and tanks cannot be fully explored unless they are
emptied. On other occasions, however, it may be prudent or necessary to
counter threats farther out to sea, such as in the 200-nautical-mile (nm)
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or beyond that limit and on the high
seas.3
While MSO include a wide variety of marine constabulary functions,
naval forces employ doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures for
vessel interdiction or maritime interception operations (MIO). The term
“MIO” itself encompasses a small assortment of naval missions,
2. WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA: A WORLD OF FREEDOM, CHAOS, AND
CRIME 5-8 (2004).
3. A nautical mile is equivalent to one minute of latitude at the equator and is 1,852
meters or 6,076 feet in length. A statute mile on land is 5,280 feet in length.
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including naval control and protection of shipping, diversion of vessels
away from an area or into port, escort or protection of endangered
vessels, and maintenance of maritime security zones and restricted access
to sea areas. MIO also includes visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS)
of ships, and associated capture of dangerous persons or seizure of ships
and cargoes.
The interception and boarding of a ship during peacetime involves
the physical act of intercepting a vessel, which may include approaching
and querying the ship (approach and possibly visit), stopping the vessel,
sending a boarding team onto the ship (board), conducting an inspection
or search of the ship and its cargo (search), and potentially apprehending
persons on board and confiscating the ship or cargo (seizure). Maritime
interception against suspect vessels may be conducted in consensual,
permissive, or non-permissive environments, and in a wide variety of
circumstances. Consequently, legal analysis for MIO and VBSS can
become complex because it involves addressing two questions of mixed
fact and law.4 First, the commanding officer of the intercepting ship
must acquire and maintain situational awareness of the vessel to be
boarded in relation to the maritime zones and navigational regimes
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).5
As a general rule, MIO may be conducted by an intercepting vessel
either in its own territorial sea, or outside the territorial sea—sovereign
water and airspace—of any other state. Coastal states exercise
sovereignty over their territorial sea, which normally extends 12 nm from
the low water mark running along the shore. Although ships of all
nations are entitled to exercise the right of innocent passage in the
territorial sea, this right typically does not include the right to conduct
VBSS. Interception of a vessel and executing a VBSS inside the
territorial sea of a coastal state without its consent typically would be
regarded as an interference with the sovereignty of a coastal state.
4. The U.S. Navy defines MIO as “efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant
vessels in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in
support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of
restricted goods.” THE NAVAL SERVICE, NAVAL DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 1: NAVAL
WARFARE 37 (2010). VBSS is defined as follows: “procedures by which U.S. forces
conduct maritime interception operations in order to determine the true character of
vessels, cargo, and passengers.” DEP’T OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVY
OPERATIONS, NAVY SUPPLEMENT TO THE DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS 2-88 (2010).
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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Although ships enjoying the right of innocent passage may use force
in self-defense, a coastal state has responsibility for the maintenance of
maritime security and marine law enforcement inside the territorial sea.
Assuming that the state conducting a VBSS has authority to exercise
enforcement jurisdiction in the water space of the suspect vessel—that is,
the boarding is occurring either inside its own territorial sea or beyond
other nations’ territorial seas—a second and perhaps more complex line
of inquiry must be addressed: the legal rationale for the boarding.
Normally vessels are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag
state—the nation in which the ship is registered. A warship may always
exercise enforcement jurisdiction over its own ships as a matter of
international law. If the vessel to be boarded is a foreign-flagged ship,
however, there must be some additional basis for a warship to exercise
enforcement jurisdiction over it.
Exceptions to exclusive flag state jurisdiction exist in times of war or
armed conflict, such as the belligerent right of visit and search of a vessel
to determine the enemy character of the ship or its cargo.6 The belligerent
right of visit and search, which is a product of the law of naval warfare,
is a separate legal right from peacetime MIO and VBSS.7 Belligerent
parties to a conflict are entitled to board neutral ships anywhere in the
oceans outside the territorial sea of a neutral state for the purpose of
ascertaining the enemy character of the ship or its cargo. This wartime
right is distinct from the aforementioned peacetime rule, in which the
warship of one nation normally may not assert jurisdiction or control
over a ship registered in another state. In time of peace, VBSS may only
occur against a foreign-flagged ship subject to some other legal rationale
that serves as an exception to exclusive flag state jurisdiction.
Generally, the state in which a ship is registered—the flag state—
exercises exclusive enforcement jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag.
There are exceptions to this universal rule, however. In contrast to the
special ship boarding regimes applicable during times of war, the legal
rationale for boarding foreign-flagged vessels in peacetime are more
numerous, and in several respects more complicated. While the law of
naval warfare is a rather discrete body of authority with well-developed
ship boarding measures, the rules for ship boarding during peacetime
6. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
7. For a thorough treatment of the belligerent right of visit and search during time of
armed conflict, see Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture
in Naval Warfare: Part I, The Traditional Law, 29 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 283 (1991); see
also Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval
Warfare: Part II, Developments Since 1945, 30 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 89 (1992).
AT SEA 25-29
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draw on a milieu of sources, and they arise more often. In both war and
peace, however, only warships or government vessels on noncommercial service, such as marine law enforcement or coast guard
ships, may exercise VBSS. The terrorist attacks against the United States
on September 11, 2001, and the broadened sense of vulnerability to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has drawn even greater variation
into the peacetime composite of norms and regimes. The 2001 attacks
illustrated a shocking breach of security in the aviation transportation
system, and in doing so also exposed glaring vulnerabilities in the
maritime domain and worldwide cargo chain.
This Article focuses on the sources of international law that states
may invoke as a legal basis for boarding foreign-flagged ships in time of
peace. In many nations, additional implementing legislation provides a
domestic basis for the activity in municipal law. Furthermore, states
conducting VBSS have developed an entire retinue of associated norms,
regimes, regulations and doctrine that provide additional fidelity to
custom and state practice. In U.S. waters, for example, boarding U.S.
vessels for law enforcement purposes is most often conducted by the
U.S. Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard uses the term “boarding” to mean an “armed
intervention aboard a vessel to detect [or] suppress violations of
applicable law.”8 Once on board a ship, Coast Guard officers may
conduct inquiries, boat inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests to
enforce U.S. law. The Coast Guard’s authority may be exercised on
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or against U.S.
ships on the high seas.9 The U.S. Navy also has extensive doctrine on the
conduct of VBSS in unilateral, joint, or combined operational
environments.10 The Navy and Coast Guard are partner armed forces, and
they often conduct VBSS together, with individual boarding teams
comprised of U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments
operating in conjunction with Navy boarding teams, which may include
trained sailors, special operations forces, or U.S. Marine Corps
commandos. Much larger organizations, such as the 2,200-person Marine
Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) or MEU/SOC of the

8. MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 3.A.2 (U.S. Coast Guard ed., 1983).
9. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 2.32, 2.36 (2009) (defining “high seas” and “waters subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States”).
10. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NAVY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS 3-07.11M (2008) (note: this document has
restricted distribution and is not publicly available).
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U.S. Marine Corps, also are prepared to execute a VBSS or MIO
throughout the peace-war continuum.11
There are a handful of especially crucial international rules and
institutions that naval forces, coast guards, and maritime law
enforcement authorities invoke as legal authority for boarding foreignflagged merchant ships. The July 28, 2010, entry into force of a newly
negotiated ship boarding regime—the 2005 Protocol to the 1988
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA)—provides a timely point of departure for
taking stock of the array of VBSS authorities in international law. There
exist more legally comprehensive treatments of some aspects of VBSS,
particularly within the best volume on the topic by Douglas Guilfoyle.12
The present study, however, is distinct in that it provides both a
maritime operational context for the architecture of VBSS authorities in
international law, connecting them to the naval forces that actually
implement ship boarding operations, and also includes some background
on United States approaches to development of the law. The original
1988 SUA treaty was adopted in the wake of the Palestinian terrorist
attack on the Italian-flagged cruise ship, Achille Lauro. With the deposit
of its instrument of ratification on April 29, 2010, the Republic of Nauru
became the twelfth country to ratify the 2005 SUA Protocol. The twelfth
ratification triggered a ninety-day clock, which ushered the treaty into
force on July 28, 2010. Bulgaria became the seventeenth state to ratify
the 2005 Protocol on October 7, 2010.13
As important as it is, the SUA treaty is only one international legal
authority for boarding ships at sea, and the entry into force of the 2005
Protocol gives rise to the need for a broader understanding of the rest of
the tools in the legal toolkit available to maritime security forces.
Maritime security forces that seek to board a foreign-flagged merchant
ship may obtain flag state permission, the consent of the master of the
vessel, and under certain circumstances, board the ship as an exercise in
lawful self-defense or pursuant to a U.N. Security Council Resolution
adopted under Chapter VII. The exercise of port state control measures
11. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, MARINE CORPS ORDER 3120.9B,
POLICY FOR MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) (MEU/SOC)
(2001)
(outlining
U.S.
Marine
Corps
policy),
available
at
http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/pp&o/POE/POE-301/Documents/MCO%203120.9B.pdf.
12. See generally, DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA 21-262 (2009).
13. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation: Ratification by
Bulgaria, IMO DOC. SUA.3/Circ.16 (Oct. 12, 2010).
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may facilitate boarding a ship at the pier, and foreign-flagged ships that
violate certain coastal state laws may be boarded in the territorial sea or
contiguous zone.
A. Ship Boarding and Sea Power
Ship boarding has always been an important component of naval
operations and sea power. For one thousand years, beginning in the
ancient Greek world, extending through the centuries of the Roman
Republic and Empire and into the early Middle Ages, naval warfare in
the West was fought by soldiers embarked on galleys. There was very
little change in the way galley warfare was conducted in the GrecoPersian wars in the fifth century B.C. and the Holy League contest
against the Ottoman fleets in the fifteenth century. Warfare at sea
essentially was ground combat fought from mobile, floating platforms;
only with the introduction of mounted firearms did ships begin to fight
against ships. The revolution in mounted cannons on Western warships,
combined with the move to all-sail ships, propelled Western navies into
technological preeminence, and world domination.
Beginning with the Iberian colonization of the New World and the
emergence of the maritime states of the United Dutch Provinces and the
United Kingdom, maritime security was a product of big-gun warships.
For four centuries, the greatest threats to maritime security lay in the
naval power of the Ottoman fleets, the impressive display of the Spanish
armada, the aircraft carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy, and the
pocket battleships and U-boats of the German High Seas Fleet. During
this period of conventional naval warfare, ship boarding primarily was a
function of counter-piracy operations and prize law, as well as the
belligerent right of visit and search in the law of naval warfare. But in the
past three decades, the growth in insurgency, terrorism, and international
criminal organizations have emerged from the process of social, political,
and economic globalization. Piracy has made a comeback. Traditional
navies have scrambled to adapt to and address these emergent and
unconventional threats, reinvigorating the doctrine, policy, and
international law of ship boarding.
II. THREATS IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN
Today the most ominous maritime threats emanate not from enemy
capital warships, but from the lower end of the threat spectrum.
Merchant vessels serve as conduits for the movement of illicit and
dangerous cargo, persons, and weapons. In countering this new threat,
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capital warships are both more costly and less useful than smaller
vessels. Instead of development of “breakthrough” weapons such as the
Dreadnought battleship in 1906, the submarine in 1912, and the aircraft
carrier in the 1920s and 1930s, today the rule of law serves as an
effective force multiplier for enhancing maritime security.14 And because
ships must eventually enter into port, port state authorities, operating in
nations that may have no navy at all, have become important nodes in
ensuring the security of the world’s marine transportation system.
There are an increasing variety of violent, non-state actors operating
in the oceans. Sub-state criminal and terrorist organizations plying the
sea have multiplied. In March 1993, for example, Islamic terrorists
clandestinely smuggled arms, ammunition, and explosives by ship from
Karachi into the Indian state of Maharashtra, leading to devastating
attacks. More recently, in December 2008, commandos from the Islamic
terrorist group Lashkar-e-taiba traveled by sea on a hijacked Indian
fishing vessel, infiltrating India. Once inside the country, the group went
on a murderous rampage throughout Mumbai, killing nearly two hundred
people and bringing the financial center of India to a standstill.
Across the forty mile wide Palk Strait in South Asia, neighboring Sri
Lanka has recently ended a three-decades-long war of attrition against
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The small and fast suicide
boats of the “Sea Tigers,” the maritime wing of the LTTE, were the most
effective maritime terrorist platform in the world. Over the years, the Sea
Tigers sank dozens of Sri Lankan ships—claiming a higher tonnage of
vessels destroyed than any conventional naval force of the contemporary
era. The group also engaged in numerous vessel hijackings, including the
seizure of the Irish Moa in 1995, the Princess Wave in 1996, the Athena,
Misen, Morong Bon, and the MV Cordiality in 1997, and the Princess
Kash in 1998. The group also hijacked the Malaysian-flagged MV Sik
Yang in 1999—neither the ship nor the sixty-three crew members were
ever heard from again. In February 2008, the Sea Tigers sank a Sri
Lankan fast attack craft in the sea of Thalaimannar, almost 200 nm from
Colombo. Before the defeat of the LTTE, the Sea Tigers were
extraordinarily successful, sinking over 30 percent of the small boats in
the Sri Lankan navy. Although the LTTE eventually was defeated on
land, the Sea Tigers were never beaten at sea, and their success
represents the specter of a new face of maritime terrorism.
In the intervening decades since the LTTE began its campaign, other
prominent maritime terrorist attacks have occurred throughout the world,
14. Commander James Kraska, Grasping “The Influence of Law on Sea Power,” 62
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 113, 121-22 (2009).
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including the bombing of Lord Mountbatten’s private yacht in 1979 by
the Provisional Irish Republican Army. In 2000, Al-Qaeda attacked the
USS Cole (DDG 67) in Aden, Yemen. The slow, low-tech suicide assault
on the USS Cole killed seventeen sailors and nearly sank the powerful
warship. The attack on the French oil tanker Limburg, also by Al-Qaeda,
occurred off the coast of Yemen in October 2002, and exposed the
vulnerability of energy sea lines of communication between the Strait of
Hormuz and thirsty markets in Europe and Asia. The deadly bombing of
Super Ferry 14 in 2004 by the Abu Sayyaf organization in the
Philippines killed 116 people—the world’s greatest maritime terrorist
attack. Two years later, in 2006, a Chinese-made C-802 cruise missile
launched by Hezbollah struck the Sa’ar 5-class Israeli Navy corvette,
INS Hanit, heavily damaging the ship and killing four crew members.
Even more recently, on July 28, 2010, the Japanese oil tanker M Star was
damaged by an attack while traveling from Qatar to Japan.15 The
mysterious explosion appears to have been detonated by Abdullah
Azzam Brigades, an Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group.16
Even more creative maritime dangers may be on the horizon. In the
Gulf of Guinea, for example, guerillas from the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta utilize small boat swarms to disrupt
offshore oil infrastructure. There is a renaissance underway in the
development of unmanned aerial systems in conventional armed forces.
As the technology becomes ubiquitous, it could be misappropriated by
insurgent groups and misused for developing water-borne improvised
explosive devices. Commercial, off-the-shelf unmanned underwater
vehicles that are used for oceanography may be converted into torpedoes
or marine mines. Finally, social media and cell phones now may be used
to network agitating “flash mobs” embarked on swarms of shallow water
vessels that could converge at sea to endanger merchant shipping or
block the mobility of warships. Nations have responded to these lowerorder and evolving maritime threats, not by destroying ships, but by
boarding them. In doing so, states invoke a range of legal and policy
rationales for inspecting or searching a ship and seizing the vessel, or its
crew, passengers, or cargo.

15. Mystery of Japanese Tanker Damage Probed, BBC NEWS, July 29, 2010,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10803239.
16. Japanese Tanker was Damaged in Terror Attack, UAE Says, BBC NEWS, Aug. 6,
2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-10890098.
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III. THE NORMS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA—FLAG STATES, PORT STATES,
AND COASTAL STATES
Contemporary international law of the sea has developed over the
past four centuries of the modern world, yet some of the norms reflected
in oceans law date to antiquity. The norm of freedom of the seas, for
example, was championed by Ancient Phoenicia, and was a feature of
the law and policy of Ancient Greece and Rome. Norms governing
conduct at sea developed across historical periods during peace and war.
International maritime incidents, and state responses thereto, are normindicators and norm-generators.17 A norm exists in a given social setting
to the extent that states or individuals usually act in a certain way and
face consequences when they do not act in this way.18 Realists would
suggest that norms are upheld through rationalist pursuit of self-interest
or national interest, but norms also inevitably reflect a sense of justice
and morality. Although there is a deontological element to norms, it does
not mean that sea power and politics are irrelevant.19 Perhaps the
strongest and most long-standing norm in oceans governance is exclusive
flag state jurisdiction.
A. Flag State Authority and Master’s Consent
With more than 155 state parties, UNCLOS is the “constitution” for
the world’s oceans. The treaty reflects customary international law
concerning operations at sea, providing a framework for peacetime
maritime security operations. As a general principle, vessels in
international waters are immune from the jurisdiction of any nation other
than the flag state. This concept of exclusive flag state jurisdiction is the
bedrock of authority governing VBSS, and necessarily serves as the
point of departure for any study on ship boarding.
Vessels on the high seas are subject to the norm of exclusive flag
state jurisdiction, unless there is an exception or intervening rule. This
means that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of security and
law enforcement on ships in international waters falls on the flag state.
States may provide permission or consent to outsource their
17. W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the
Study of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN
WORLD POLITICS 3-7 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988).
18. Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1095, 1097 (1986).
19. Gary Goertz & Paul F. Diehl, Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some
Conceptual and Measurement Issues, 36 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 634, 639 (1992).
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responsibility, which may include negotiation of bilateral or multilateral
agreements with other nations, but the flag state possesses authority as a
matter of sovereignty. Commanders operating at sea may seek consent to
board a vessel from the flag state on an ad hoc basis as well, either by
requesting approval from the national-level authorities of the flag state,
or by seeking the consent of the master of the vessel. Coordinating VBSS
of a flag state’s merchant ships is an exercise, rather than a diminution,
of flag state sovereignty. Permission to board may be narrowly
circumscribed, however, and does not necessarily entail consent to
inspect, search or seize the vessel. Flag states cooperate to leverage the
capabilities of other states to enforce international standards of safety and
security. Nowhere is collaboration so ingrained than in counter-drug
operations at sea.
1. Counter-Drug Cooperation
Cocaine is the second most common illegal drug entering the United
States. The illicit cocaine market funnels vast sums of cash to criminal
gangs throughout the Americas, including Mexican drug cartels and the
terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia.
Illegal drugs travel by sea from the Andean Ridge to isolated beaches
along the coasts of Mexico, where the contraband is loaded onto trucks
and driven across the Southwest border.
Treaties to suppress international drug trafficking constitute some of
the most mature maritime treaties designed to promote maritime security
cooperation. For example, 17(3)-(4) and (7)-(11) of the 1988 U.N.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (“Vienna Convention”), urges states to cooperate and provide
consent in the boarding of their ships engaged in international drug
trafficking.20 Article 108 of UNCLOS reflects the duty of all states to
cooperate in the suppression of illicit drug trafficking by ships on the
high seas. These rules apply through extension of Article 58(2) to the
EEZ. The member states of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) have developed concrete regimes that reflect the norms to
suppress maritime drug trafficking through 1990 amendments to the
1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic
20. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances art. 17, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, 28 I.L.M. 493; see
Eur. Consult. Ass., Agreement by Illicit Traffic by Sea, Implementing Article 17 of the
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Pyschotropic
Substances, Doc. No. 156 (1995).
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(FAL).21 The guidance and industry practices adopted by FAL are aimed
at enhancing port state security. More recently, the IMO Assembly
adopted guidelines for the suppression of illicit drug trafficking.22
Shiprider agreements, which may be either bilateral or multilateral
arrangements, permit marine law enforcement forces of one state to
embark in the patrol vessel of another state. Shiprider agreements may be
used in a variety of contexts, including fisheries enforcement, marine
environmental protection, countering illegal migration and human
smuggling, and disrupting international drug trafficking. The agreements
serve as a force multiplier and create a synergistic link among flag, port,
coastal states, and interdicting states. A law enforcement official riding
on a foreign warship may quickly authorize a foreign boarding party to
inspect a suspicious vessel flying the same flag as the shiprider. The
shiprider agreement between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago,
for example, even allows U.S. law to be enforced against a ship engaged
in drug trafficking that is registered in Trinidad and Tobago.23
The United States has twenty-seven such agreements, which link the
counter-drug efforts of the nation to Caribbean and Latin American
states, as well as the United Kingdom. The agreement between the
United States and the United Kingdom provides a non-reciprocal right of
ship boarding,24 whereas the agreement between Spain and Italy grants
standing authority for each to conduct visit and search of the other’s
vessels.25 Typically, bilateral agreements establish a streamlined
procedure for a nation seeking to board the vessel of another state to
obtain consent from the flag state on a case-by-case basis. Likewise,
states may negotiate multilateral shiprider agreements, such as the 2003
Caribbean Regional Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing
21. See, e.g., IMO, Prevention of Drug Smuggling on Ships Engaged in International
Traffic: Interim Guidelines for Use by Shipowners, Seafarers and Others Closely
Involved with the Operation of Ships, IMO DOC. FAL.5/Circ.1 (Feb. 5, 1997); see also,
IMO, Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse: Guidelines for Shipowners and Masters on
Prevention, Detection and Recognition, IMO DOC. FAL.5/Circ.9 (Jan. 25, 1996).
22. IMO, Guidelines for the Prevention and Suppression of the Smuggling of Drugs,
Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals on Ships Engaged in International
Maritime Traffic, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 872 (20) (Nov. 27, 1997). The Guidelines
attached to the resolution replaced the interim Guidelines adopted in IMO FAL.5/Circ.
1/Rev.1 (Feb. 5, 1997).
23. Agreement Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug Operation, ¶ 6, Mar. 4, 1996,
T.I.A.S. 12732.
24. Agreement Concerning Narcotic Drugs: Interdiction of Vessels, U.S.-U.K., ¶ 1,
Nov. 13, 1981, T.I.A.S. 10296.
25. Treaty Between the Kingdom of Spain and the Italian Republic to Combat Illicit
Drug Trafficking at Sea, Spain-It., art. 5, Mar. 23, 1990, 1776 U.N.T.S. 242.
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Illicity Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances in the Caribbean Area.26
2. Proliferation Security Initiative
One million tons of cocaine flow into the United States every year,
and the astonishing quantity of illegal drugs opens the door to the
prospect of smuggling even more malicious cargo—including WMDs—
into the United States. Perhaps the most pernicious threat from the sea is
the surreptitious introduction of terrorists or WMDs via the international
marine transportation system. The reality of this threat was exposed by
the transit of a small, shadowy North Korean freighter, the MV So San.
In October 2002, less than one year after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, Spanish commandos conducted a fast-rope rappel
onto the decks of the freighter MV So San, which was underway in the
Indian Ocean. The saga of the MV So San began when North Korea
secretly loaded the vessel with Scud missiles, missile fuel, high explosive
warheads, and other missile components; the ship set sail from Asia
bound for the Middle East. Operating on British and American
intelligence, the Spanish frigates Patino and Navarra approached and
queried the ship. Steaming 600 miles off the Horn of Africa, So San
provided inconsistent responses to warship queries, and ultimately the
vessel claimed Cambodian registry, something Phnom Penh was unable
to verify. Consequently, the government of Cambodia granted
conditional consent for forces to board the vessel, assuming the ship was
in fact registered in Cambodia.
Once on board the ship, the marines discovered the Scud missiles
and associated components hidden under a cargo of dry cement. For
several days, American, Spanish, and British authorities were uncertain
of the destination of the cargo, until the government of Yemen stepped
forward to claim the missiles.27 During the So San crisis, I served as a
legal adviser on a major Pentagon staff, which searched in vain for a
legal justification that would permit the nations involved to detain the
illicit cargo. Upon assurances from officials in the Yemeni capital of
Sana’a that the missiles would be properly secured and not transferred to
a third country, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States
26. J. Ashley Roach, Initiatives to Enhance Maritime Security, 28 MARINE POL’Y 41,
64 (2004) (describing ship boarding provisions).
27. Use of Force and Arms Control, 2002 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 18, at 1052-57, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/139638.pdf.
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released the cargo. There was no lawful basis to detain the ship or
confiscate its cargo, but the incident generated a great deal of interest
inside the White House to develop a more effective international dragnet
to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. The effect of the incident
throughout the U.S. maritime security policy community was palpable;
immediately work began tightening the rules of nonproliferation and
counterterrorism.
Just seven months after the So San incident, President George W.
Bush unveiled the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Standing in
solidarity with eleven core partner nations meeting in Krakow, Poland,
the United States proclaimed the first comprehensive effort to take stock
of the range of instruments and authorities to promote global,
cooperative action against the spread of WMDs.28 PSI is an activity, not
an organization or institution, and the only requirement to participate is
acceptance and ability to adhere to the Interdiction Principles for the
Proliferation Security Initiative, which were subsequently reached in
September 2003.29
Maritime interdiction is a key component of PSI, which promotes a
cooperative network for maritime interdiction of vessels reasonably
suspected of transporting cargoes of WMDs, their delivery systems, or
related materials. PSI seeks to establish a more dynamic, creative, and
proactive approach to preventing proliferation to or from states and nonstate actors. Many officials in the U.S. government described PSI to
Sharon Squassoni of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) this
way: PSI relies on the “broken taillight scenario,” whereby officials from
a range of cooperating states look for “all available options to stop a ship
suspected of transporting WMD[s].”30 But no legal corners are cut. One
of the early participants in PSI emphasizes that it is grounded in
compliance with national and international law and frameworks,
including respect for exclusive flag state jurisdiction.31 Participation in
PSI represents political will for nations to “seriously consider providing
consent under appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching
28. See Proliferation Security Initiative Participants, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (last
updated Sept. 10, 2010), www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm.
29. The Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (last updated Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm.
30. SHARON SQUASSONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21881, PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE 4 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/
RS21881.pdf.
31. J. Ashley Roach, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Countering Proliferation
by Sea, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND CHINA 351, 353 (Myron
H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore & Kuen-chen Fu, eds., 2006).
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of its own flag vessels by other States and to the seizure of such WMDrelated cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such States.”32
Only months after the initiative was launched, British and American
intelligence communities discovered that the German-registered vessel,
BBC China, was transporting uranium enrichment equipment from
Malaysia to Libya, via Dubai. With the consent of Germany, the vessel
was diverted to the Italian port of Taranto, and Italian authorities
searched the vessel and seized the centrifuge materials, which were not
listed on the cargo manifest. Two months later, Libya announced that it
was abandoning its ambition to develop a uranium enrichment
capability.33 The BBC China interdiction has been followed by additional
PSI successes that, for political reasons, have not been widely
publicized.34 These successful efforts include disrupting Iranian attempts
to procure goods for its nuclear program, and preventing a country in
another region of the world from receiving equipment for a ballistic
missile program.35
PSI is now supported by more than ninety nations, and has been
endorsed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).36 In 1994,
NATO expressed strong support for counter-proliferation efforts.37 A
July 20, 2007 proposal by the NATO Senior Defence Group on
Proliferation subsequently was endorsed by the North Atlantic Council
on September 26, 2007. NATO support for PSI was reaffirmed.38 The
initiative also was endorsed by the countries of the G8 and the former
U.N. Secretary-General.39
32. CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 3520.02A, PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) ACTIVITY PROGRAM (2007).
33. Robin Wright, Ship Incident May Have Swayed Libya, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2004
at A18.
34. Robert Joseph, Remarks at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in
Singapore 5 (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.nti.orgle_research/official_docs/
dos/dos081505.pdf.
35. Id.
36. Proliferation Security Initiative Participants, supra note 28.
37. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Alliance Policy Framework on
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council, June 9-10, 1994, NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(94)45 (June 9, 1994),
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940609a.htm.
38. Press Release, NATO, Istanbul Summit Communiqué (June 28, 2004), available
at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm.
39. Pierre Claude Nolin, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Nuclear Weapons
Proliferation, at 5, NATO Doc. 168 STC 04 E Rev. 1 (Nov. 2004); U.N. SecretaryGeneral, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶ 132, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004).
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Eleven states have signed PSI ship boarding agreements with the
United States.40 As a member of the U.S. delegation for negotiations for
several of these treaties, I would suggest that it is important to
understand that the agreements typically do not constitute blanket
authority for one state to automatically board the ships of a partner
nation. Although there are four primary models among the nine
agreements, in general the treaties establish a mechanism for flag state
expedited review of a request by one party to board a ship registered by
the other party. The agreements may contain a provision for presumed
consent if a request to board a ship of one party, however, is not denied
by the flag state within a few hours.
3. Master’s Consent
Both the counterdrug shiprider agreements and the PSI ship boarding
agreements serve as proxies for or to facilitate flag state consent of a
request to board a suspicious vessel. The United States also accepts that
the master of a vessel can provide authorization for boarding his ship.
Authority for boarding based solely on the basis of the master’s consent
is derived from the master’s plenary authority over the ship, and reflects
the custom and state practice of flag states and their masters. Masters are
endowed with plenary authority over their ship while it is in international
waters, and may allow anyone to come on board the vessel as his guest,
including foreign law enforcement officials and military forces. Such
invited vessel boardings, if not coerced by the warship, are consensual in
nature. There is no codified rule of international law expressly
authorizing the master of a vessel to grant consent to board his vessel,
but longstanding maritime custom supports the practice. The United
States and Coalition partners used permission from vessel masters to
conduct boardings of foreign-flagged merchant ships throughout the
Persian Gulf in the aftermath of the first Gulf War and the attacks of
September 11, 2001.
Some nations do not recognize a master’s authority to assent to a
consensual boarding. The voluntary consent of the master permits the
boarding, but it does not allow the assertion of law enforcement
authority. A consensual boarding is not, therefore, an exercise of
maritime law enforcement jurisdiction per se. The scope and duration of
40. See Ship Boarding Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 29, 2010, 8:59 PM),
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27733.htm (listing countries participating in ship boarding
agreements; the author participated in negotiating the agreements with Bahamas and
Malta).
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a consensual boarding may be subject to conditions imposed by the
master and may be terminated by the master at his discretion.
Nevertheless, such boardings have utility in allowing rapid verification
of the legitimacy of a vessel’s voyage by obtaining or confirming vessel
documents, cargo, and navigation records without undue delay to the
boarded vessel. In cases where the vessel’s flag state is a party to a
bilateral/multilateral agreement, including a ship boarding provision, and
there exist reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is engaged in the
illicit activity that is the subject of the agreement, boarding shall be
conducted under the terms of that agreement vice seeking the master’s
consent.
4. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
Under the “Straddling Stocks” or “Fish Stocks” Agreement, states
may, in certain circumstances, board foreign-flagged vessels in order to
prevent over-fishing.41 Furthermore, parties that are also members of
sub-regional fisheries agreements or Regional Fisheries Management
Organizations may board foreign-flagged vessels and enforce subregional or regional agreements even if the vessel is registered in a state
that is not a party to such agreement, so long as the ship is registered in a
state that is party to the overall Fish Stocks Agreement.42 During
fisheries enforcement interdictions, the boarding party should “avoid the
use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety
of the inspectors” or in situations involving opposed boarding, in which
43
“the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their duties.” In all
cases the use of force must be reasonable under the circumstances.
Beyond this exception, however, the flag state exercises general
exclusive flag state jurisdiction over fishing vessels flying its flag,
subject to the rights of the coastal state to enforce its EEZ.44
B. Port State Control Measures
Often enforcement and compliance with international shipping
regulations is most effectively accomplished in port, with collaboration
41. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 20,
opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3, 34 I.L.M. 1542.
42. Id. art. 21.
43. Id. art. 22(1)(f).
44. Id. art. 19.
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of all interested parties, and with the flag state in a central role. In
addition to flag state consent under Articles 92 and 94 and port state
control measures under Article 25 of UNCLOS,45 there are ample
authorities for boarding vessels either at sea or at the pier. All States
exercise sovereignty within their ports, roadsteads, and inland waters and
may enforce national laws over foreign commercial ships in those areas.
Under international law, a coastal state may impose conditions on ships
entering its ports or internal waters, including requirements for vessel
prior boarding and inspection before entering port. A “port” consists of
the permanent harborworks that are an integral part of the harbor system
forming part of the coast.46 In the United States, the Coast Guard uses
extensive port state control measures of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 as an important element of maritime
homeland security, as well as for enforcement of U.S. environmental
laws.47 A roadstead is a port extension facility used in loading,
unloading, and anchoring of ships within the territorial sea.48 Such
provisions should be applied on a non-discriminatory basis.
Any ship, including a warship, may be denied entry into port by a
port state for virtually any reason, although there is an exception for
force majeure. Boarding and inspection may occur at any time, even
prior to port entry such as when the vessel is in territorial seas, the EEZ,
or even on the high seas. Foreign warships and other ships entitled to
sovereign immunity must comply with the laws and regulations of the
coastal state, but may not be boarded or inspected.
C. Coastal State Authority
The sovereignty of a coastal state extends beyond its land territory
and internal waters “to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial
sea.”49 Generally, the ships of all nations are entitled to conduct
“innocent passage” in the territorial sea, waters extending seaward from
the shoreline to 12 nm, of a coastal state. International law allows coastal
states to adopt laws and regulations relating to innocent passage through
45. UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 25, 92, 94.
46. Id. art. 11.
47. See, e.g., Maritime Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-295, § 104, 116
Stat. 2064, 2085 (2002) (amending the definition of territorial waters for purposes of
enforcement of maritime security provisions to include “all waters of the territorial sea of
the United States as described in Presidential Proclamation 5928 of December 27,
1988”).
48. Id. art. 12.
49. UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 2(1).
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the territorial sea, but such laws and regulations shall not apply to the
design, construction, manning, or equipment of foreign ships unless they
are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards
and are applied in a non-discriminatory manner.50 The United States
strictly interprets Articles 19 and 25 as inclusive of all activities that
make passage non-innocent.51 The American delegate to the Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea reiterated this long-standing position
during the negotiations of the UNCLOS:52
The United States understands, with respect to the right of innocent
passage under UNCLOS, that—
(A) all ships, including warships, regardless of, for example,
cargo, armament, means of propulsion, flag, origin, destination,
or purpose, enjoy the right of innocent passage;
(B) article 19(2) contains an exhaustive list of activities that
render passage non-innocent;
(C) any determination of non-innocence of passage by a ship
must be made on the basis of acts it commits while in the
territorial sea, and not on the basis of, for example, cargo,
armament, means of propulsion, flag, origin, destination, or
purpose; and
(D) the Convention does not authorize a coastal State to
condition the exercise of the right of innocent passage by any
ships, including warships, on the giving of prior notification to or
the receipt of prior permission from the coastal State.53
The list of activities in Article 19 that are inconsistent with the right
of innocent passage are narrowly construed by the U.S. government, both
in cases involving foreign-flagged vessels operating within the United
States’ territorial sea and in cases of U.S. vessels transiting in other
nations’ territorial seas. This understanding of Article 19 was
strengthened by the complementary and mutual agreement of the United
States and the U.S.S.R. in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the “Jackson Hole

50. Id. art. 24(1).
51. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jam.,
Note by the Secretariat, 243-4, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/WS/37 (Dec. 10 1982), available
at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1982/ docs/vol_XVII/
a_conf-62_ws_37%20and%20add-1%20and%202.pdf.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Agreement.”54 Meeting at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in September 1989,
the two superpowers agreed that Article 19 contains the “exhaustive list”
of activities that may be considered non-innocent.55 Innocent passage
may not be conditioned by notification or consent by the coastal state.56
Paragraph 2 of the Jackson Hole Agreement states that, “[a]ll ships,
including warships, regardless of cargo, armament or means of
propulsion, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea
in accordance with international law, for which neither prior notification
nor authorization is required.”57
Coastal states, however, may take the necessary steps to prevent
passage in its territorial sea that is “not innocent,”58 meaning that the
transit is “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State.”59 Coastal states also may temporarily suspend innocent passage
in localized areas if doing so is “essential for the protection of its
security. . . .”60
The Espionage Act of 1917,61 as amended by the Magnuson Act of
1950,62 authorized the President to institute measures and promulgate
rules and regulations necessary to govern the movement and anchorage
of foreign-flag vessels in the territorial waters of the United States and to
inspect such vessels at any time. The MTSA amended the definition of
territorial waters for purposes of these provisions to include “all waters
of the territorial sea of the United States.”63 This had the effect of
extending the territorial sea for purposes of the jurisdiction of the 1917
Espionage Act to 12 NM.64 The law authorized measures and regulations
to safeguard against the destruction, loss, or injury of vessels, harbors,
ports, and waterfront facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States due to sabotage or subversive acts, accidents, or other similar
causes.65 These measures and regulations are authorized whenever the
54. Joint Statement With Attached Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International
Law Governing Innocent Passage, U.S.-U.S.S.R., ¶¶ 2-3, Sept. 23, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1444
[hereinafter Jackson Hole Agreement].
55. Id. ¶ 3.
56. Id. ¶ 2.
57. Id.
58. UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 25(1).
59. Id. art. 19(1).
60. Id. art. 25(3).
61. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 220 (1917).
62. Magnuson Act of 1950, ch. 656, 64 Stat. 427-28 (1950).
63. Maritime Transportation Security Act § 104 (a)(2).
64. Presidential Proclamation No. 5928: Territorial Sea of the United States of
America, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).
65. 50 U.S.C.A. § 191 (Lexis Nexis 2003).
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President determines that war or “disturbances of international relations”
endangers the security of the United States.66
In 1950, President Truman found that the security of the United
States was endangered and directed that the provisions of the Espionage
Act and the Magnuson Act be implemented. He also prescribed certain
port security regulations to be enforced by the Coast Guard.67 The
finding of endangerment to the security of the United States has
remained in effect continuously since its issuance and has taken on new
relevance in light of the focus on port and vessel security after the attacks
of September 11, 2001.68 The Captain of the Port or District Commander
may declare a security zone, which is an area of land, water, or land and
water designated to safeguard either internal waters “or other waters of
the United States, or to secure the observance of the rights and
obligations of the United States.”69 A security zone may be declared in
order to protect vessels, ports, or harbors in the United States and
territory and water subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.70 The
Captain of the Port has plenary police powers over persons and vessels in
a security zone for the purpose of safeguarding U.S. maritime interests.
Vessels may not “enter or remain in a security zone without the
permission of the Captain of the Port,” and “shall obey any direction or
order of the Captain of the Port.”71 The Captain of the Port also has
authority to seize any vessel in the security zone and “remove any
person, vessel, article, or thing from the security zone.”72
Ordinarily, the coastal state may not exercise criminal jurisdiction
over vessels conducting innocent passage.73 In certain cases, however,
the coastal state has authority to assert criminal jurisdiction on board a
foreign ship by conducting investigations, arresting persons, and
temporarily detaining the vessel involved, but only in certain
circumstances, such as if the “consequences of the crime extend to the
coastal State.”74 The coastal state may also assert criminal jurisdiction in
connection with a crime that is “of a kind to disturb the peace of the
country or the good order of the territorial sea,” or if the assertion of

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Exec. Order No. 10,173, 15 Fed. Reg. 7005 (Oct. 18, 1950).
Pres. Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 9387 (Feb. 26, 2002) (continuing emergency authority).
33 C.F.R. § 165.30(a) (2009).
Id. § 165.30(b).
Id. § 165.33(a), (b).
Id. § 165.33(c), (d).
UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 27(1).
Id. art. 27(1)(a).
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jurisdiction is needed to suppress narcotics trafficking.75 Coastal states
also may leverage the full panoply of legal rationale for boarding
available to all states throughout the high seas or EEZs, such as
enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions within its territorial
sea.
For example, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004
determined that, “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to
international peace and security.”76 A coastal state would be entitled
under Resolution 1540 to board a foreign-flagged ship claiming to
exercise innocent passage in its territorial sea because transporting
weapons or materials in contravention of the Security Council mandate is
both inconsistent with the right of innocent passage and is recognized as
a threat to the peace and security of the coastal state. The coastal state
would therefore be entitled to take all necessary measures in accordance
with Resolution 1540, including the range of measures that constitute
VBSS of the vessel and its cargo. The coastal state also is entitled to
prescribe and enforce customs laws as well as fiscal, immigration and
sanitary measures throughout the contiguous zone, which extends up to
24 NM from the shoreline.77 “Sanitary” measures encompass preventive
health and quarantine measures, but the term does not constitute a
general provision for protection of the marine environment.
1. Coastal State EEZ Enforcement
The exercise of civil fishing enforcement functions by the coastal
state in the EEZ is quite robust, as demonstrated by the Monte Confurco
case (Seychelles v. France), which was decided by the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 2000.78 The ITLOS
determined that a fishing vessel found with fish in its hold, transiting the
EEZ of a coastal state without the consent of that country, may be
presumed to have caught the fish in the coastal state’s EEZ in
contravention of coastal state law.79 In that case, the fish were subject to
seizure and the fishing vessel therefore had an interest—if not an
obligation—to provide prior notification of passage to the coastal state in
75. Id. art. 27(1)(b), (d).
76. S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
77. UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 33(1)-(2).
78. Monte Confurco (Sey. v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 220 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000),
available at http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=5&lang=en.
79. Id. ¶ 87.
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order to avoid having its cargo seized.80 The Monte Confurco was flying
the flag of Seychelles, and had been properly licensed to fish in
international waters.81 The Monteco Shipping Corporation, a company
also registered in Seychelles, owned the ship.82 The Monte Confurco left
Port Louis, Mauritius, on August 27, 2000, “to engage in long-line
fishing in the Southern seas.”83 On November 8, 2000, a boarding party
from the French surveillance frigate Floréal went on board the Monte
Confurco in the EEZ of the Kerguelen Islands, which are located in the
French Southern and Antarctic territory midway among Africa,
Antarctica, and Australia.84 The Captain of the Floréal issued a procèsverbal of violation (procès-verbal d’infraction) No. 1/00, against the
Master of the Monte Confurco “for having [f]ailed to announce his
presence and the quantity of fish carried aboard to the Head of the
District of the Kerguelen Islands,” for having fished without prior
authorization, and also for having tried to evade investigation by marine
fisheries agents.85
The next day the Captain drew up another procès-verbal, No. 2/00,
apprehending the fish catch in the hold of the Monte Confurco, as well as
seizing “navigation and communication equipment, computer equipment,
and documents of the vessel and of the crew.”86 The French enforcement
vessel observed a number of indicators that suggested the Monte
Confurco had been fishing illegally in the EEZ.87 The Monte Confurco
had 158 tons of Patagonian toothfish on board, valued at about $1.3
million.88 The authorities discovered long-lines drifting in the water
identical to, and whose numbers formed logical sequences with, the
Additionally, the authorities observed
Monte Confurco’s lines.89
defrosted bait that appeared to have been jettisoned into the sea, while
noting the absence of other fishing vessels in the vicinity at that time.90
Small frozen fish and fishhooks were also found onboard the fishing
vessel toward the rear of the deck amidships and there was evidence that

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28.
Monte Confurco, 125 I.L.R. 220, ¶ 29.
Id. ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶¶ 33-34.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id.
Monte Confurco, 125 I.L.R. 220, ¶ 33.
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the on-board factory had recently been cleaned and the ship had
quantities of fresh fish blood and waste.91
The vessel was arrested and it was determined that the fish would be
impounded and sold and the proceeds credited to the treasury “until court
orders were obtained in respect of the proceeds.”92 The court of first
instance at Saint-Paul noted in its November 22, 2000, order that the
Monte Confurco entered the Kerguelen Islands’ EEZ “without prior
authorization and without advising the head of a district of the nearest
archipelago of its presence.”93 The Monte Confurco failed to declare the
tonnage of fish carried on board, which also violated French
regulations.94 The Monte Confurco’s unannounced presence in the
Kerguelen Islands EEZ while in possession of a certain quantity of
toothfish that it failed to declare “raised the ‘presumption’ that the whole
catch was unlawfully fished” in the Kerguelen Islands’ EEZ.95 The ship
claimed that it had failed to notify French authorities because the
facsimile machine on the ship was not working properly,96 but France
argued that notification could have been made by satellite telephone.97
During legal proceedings, France called as an expert Professor
Duhamel, an ichthyologist, to testify as to the fish stock in the area.98
The expert believed that the toothfish in the hold could not have been
caught at the location indicated in the ship’s log, as the water in that area
was too deep.99 ITLOS found by a vote of nineteen to one that the
allegations made by France were well founded.100 ITLOS also ruled that
“France [should] promptly release the Monte Confurco and its Master
upon the posting of a bond or other security,” the amount of which was
set by ITLOS.101 In making the finding, ITLOS ruled that all of the
toothfish probably could not have been caught at the location claimed by
Seychelles, which lay outside of France’s EEZ.102 The coastal state is
entitled to wide latitude in enforcing legitimate resource-related interests
throughout the EEZ. But the EEZ is not a general security zone or
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. ¶ 34.
Id.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id.
Id.
Monte Confurco, 125 I.L.R. 220, ¶ 48.
Id. ¶ 53.
Id. ¶ 54.
Id.
Id. ¶ 96.
Id. ¶ 96(5).
Monte Confurco, 125 I.L.R. 220, ¶ 88.
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customs enforcement zone—it cannot be territorialized. For example, in
the 1999 case M/V Saiga No. 2, ITLOS rejected the suggestion that
coastal states could exercise customs authority in the EEZ.103
D. Right of Approach and Visit
The right of approach and visit applies throughout the high seas,104
and through Article 58 of UNCLOS, throughout the EEZ of all coastal
states.105 That is, the rules governing approach and visit apply for all
warships outside the territorial sea of foreign coastal states. Approach
and visit is another long-standing norm of maritime practice that is
codified in the high seas regime of UNCLOS.106 Warships of all nations
may “approach” international merchant shipping transiting beyond the
territorial sea, and inquire as to the nature of the vessel’s voyage, crew,
cargo manifest, last port, next port or previous voyages, flag state
registry, ownership, and other questions to elicit information about the
ship and its purpose.107 Only “warships” may exercise the right, and the
term includes sovereign immune ships of the coast guard or maritime law
enforcement.108 Normally the exercise of the right of approach by a
warship does not impose a requirement on the part of the queried vessel
to respond to the queries, and a refusal to respond does not automatically
trigger a right of visit on the part of the hailing ship.109 But in certain
circumstances, the warship may exercise a right of “visit” or boarding of
the foreign-flagged merchant ship, without flag state or master’s prior
consent.110
Article 110 of UNCLOS provides that as a general rule, warships of
one nation are not entitled to board foreign-flagged vessels, unless
authority to do so is derived from “powers conferred by treaty.”111
Exceptions to this tenet of international law, however, are reflected in
Article 110.112 Warships are justified in boarding a foreign-flagged
103. M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 120 I.L.R. 143, ¶ 136 (Int’l Trib. L. of
the Sea 1999).
104. UNLCOS, supra note 5, art. 110.
105. Id. art. 58(2).
106. Id. art. 110.
107. Id.
108. Article 110 refers to warships and other vessels “entitled to complete immunity in
accordance with Articles 95 and 96.” Id.
109. The Mariana-Flora, 6 U.S. (11 WHEAT.) 1, 44 (1826).
110. UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 110(1)(a)-(c).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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vessel in cases in which there is a “reasonable ground” for suspecting the
ship in question is engaged in maritime piracy, slave-trafficking, or
unauthorized broadcast at sea.113 All states may also board and inspect
vessels that carry the same flag as the investigating warship, or that are
“stateless,” meaning they are not legitimately registered to any state.114
Suspect vessels evidence a lack of valid nationality through a
number of cues, including failure to make a claim of nationality or show
a flag of registration; making contradictory claims or multiple claims of
nationality; revolving or changing flags of registration, vessel name,
home port, or signboards during a single journey; or making evasive,
misleading, or unverifiable responses to queries of nationality. In such
cases, naval vessels of any state may assimilate the ship without
nationality. Vessels without nationality that are assimilated may be
boarded and searched under the terms and rules of engagement set forth
by the state of the boarding warship. The consent of the master is not
required. Consequently, a warship may proceed to verify the flag registry
of a suspected ship. This process is accomplished by dispatching a
boarding team in a small boat under the command of an officer from the
warship to board the suspect vessel.115
If the review of ship documents confirms the suspicions, the
boarding party may conduct a more thorough inspection and examination
of the ship’s papers, and a physical search of the vessel and crew.
Occasionally, illicit cargo is secreted inside the bulkhead or overhead of
the vessel, or built into the frame of the ship, and a destructive search
may be conducted inside the vessel at sea, or through forcefully
penetrating the hull, in a port location. If the suspicions prove to be
unfounded, however, the owner of the vessel shall be compensated by
the state of the warship for any loss or damage that may have been
sustained.
In recent years, nations have exercised the right of approach and visit
most often in cases concerning maritime piracy. Piracy is “any illegal
act of violence, detention, or depredation committed beyond the
territorial sea for private ends by crew or passengers of a private ship or
aircraft against another ship, persons, or crew.”116 “Private” acts refer to
acts not committed by public officials for a public or state purpose.
Typically, piracy involves some pecuniary interest or private political
motive, such as maritime terrorism. For a violent act to meet the legal
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. art. 110(1)(a)-(c).
Id. art. 110(1)(d), (e).
Id. art. 110.
UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 101.
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definition of piracy, it must be committed outside of a state’s territorial
waters. Acts occurring inside territorial seas are classified as “armed
robbery at sea,” and are the responsibility of the coastal state to suppress.
Thus, “armed robbery at sea” in territorial waters can, a few meters
away, become “piracy.”
Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as consisting of the
following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
or of an aircraft with knowledge of the facts making it a
pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).117
In sum, Articles 100-110 of UNCLOS reaffirm the duty and
obligation of all states to act against piracy and maritime slave
trafficking. Both crimes, as well as the crime of illegal broadcast from
the sea, constitute crimes of universal jurisdiction, and all states may
assert jurisdiction over those offenses. The authority is not academic.
Warships from dozens of nations are involved in counter-piracy
operations involving VBSS of foreign-flagged vessels in the Gulf of
Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. French, Dutch, Russian, and
American forces have boarded ships in order to assert jurisdiction over
Somali pirates operating in international waters. For example, on
September 8, 2010, U.S. Marines conducted a boarding of the Magellan
Star, a German-owned commercial ship, which had been seized by
pirates off the coast of Somalia.118 The ship was retaken by elements of
the Fifteenth Marine Expeditionary Unit and USS Peleliu Amphibious
117. Id.
118. Brian Murphy, U.S. Marines Take Back Pirate-Held Ship Off Somalia, WASH.
POST, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/09/
AR2010090901655.html; see also U.S. Marines, Marines Gain Control of the MV
Magellan Star from Suspected Pirates, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=GL_Z7dG66lM (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (a U.S. Navy video of the boarding
of MV Magellan Star).
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Ready Group, operating in the Gulf of Aden. Force Reconnaissance
Marines conducted the VBSS, which resulted in the successful rescue of
the vessel’s eleven crew members, and the capture of nine suspected
pirates. The regimes underpinning this norm enforcement are mostly a
product of the U.N. system—beginning with rule sets adopted by the
member states of the U.N. and embodied in the U.N. Charter and the
treaties negotiated at the IMO, which is a specialized agency of the U.N.
IV. REGIMES IN THE U.N. CHARTER AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME ORGANIZATION
A regime differs from a norm in that it usually is conceived of as a
complex of rules and norms. The U.N. Charter, the most comprehensive
treaty in existence, captures norms, such as the right of self-defense, and
places them within a regime.119 Likewise, the international law of the sea
reflects a handful of important and long-standing norms, which
previously were discussed. The regimes embodied in UNCLOS also
bring greater fidelity to the meaning of those norms in contemporary
politics. UNCLOS was constructed around an integrated set of mutually
supporting regimes pertaining to geophysical areas on, over, or under the
oceans. A “regime” may be understood as a prevailing decision rule or rule
system, or as a set of procedures that facilitate a convergence of
expectations.120 But a regime is more than a set of rules; it presupposes a
level of institutionalization that springs from an integrated framework,
which has both qualities of formality and adherence or compliance.121 In
UNCLOS, regimes provide the standards that establish international
expectations or a sense of legal obligation. In recent decades, regimes
generally have become a more important factor in international relations
and international law due to their increasing number and their growing
influence on state behavior.122 The new regimes in UNCLOS provide the
legal model of the oceans, and set down permissible activities by foreign
states and distant water states on the surface of the seas, in the water
column, on the seabed, and in the airspace above the water.
119. U.N. Charter art. 2(4), 51 (as well as associated chapters and articles of the
Charter).
120. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regimes Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1986).
121. Richard Little, International Regimes, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD
POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 369, 373 (John Bayliss &
Steve Smith eds., 3rd ed. 2005).
122. ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 19 (1977).
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A. Self-Defense
The concept of an inherent right of self-defense, although it predates
the founding of the U.N. and is recognized in customary international
law,123 is reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter: “[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the U.N. until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”124 Thus, Article 51 recognizes the
inherent right to both individual and collective self-defense. The United
States independently recognizes that nations may legally conduct VBSS
as an instrument of self-defense, and the action may be justified either
pursuant to customary international law or Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.125
Currently, U.S. naval forces exercise the inherent right of selfdefense in accordance with the Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S.
Forces (SROE).126 Informed by policy considerations as well as by
international law, the SROE indicate that “unit commanders always
retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in
response to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.”127 A “hostile
act” is an “attack or other use of force against the United States, U.S.
forces, or other designated persons or property,” including “vital” U.S.
government property.128 “Hostile intent” means the “threat of imminent
use of force against the United States, U.S. forces or other designated
persons or property.”129 The use of force is authorized for the duration of
the demonstration of hostile intent against U.S. forces or designated
persons or property.
123. See, e.g., John Bassett Moore, 2 INT’L LAW DIG. 412 (1906) (highlighting the
Caroline case, which ruled that defensive force is permitted when the “[n]ecessity of that
self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation”).
124. U.N. Charter, supra note 119, art. 51.
125. DEP’T. OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND U.S. COAST
GUARD, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 4-4 (2007).
126. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION CJCSI 3121.01B,
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR U.S.
FORCES (2005). The SROE establish U.S. policy concerning the use of force during “all
military operations and contingencies” occurring during peacetime. Id. at 1. Classified
portions of the SROE pertain to rules that apply during periods of armed conflict.
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at L-3.
129. Id.
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There exists no precise metric for determining whether a threat of
force is “imminent,” and a determination is made “based on an
assessment of all facts and circumstances known to DOD forces at the
Furthermore, “[i]mminent does not necessarily mean
time.”130
immediate or instantaneous.”131 The use of force under SROE is
predicated on two elements—necessity and proportionality. “Necessity”
for U.S. forces exists “when a hostile act occurs or when a force
demonstrates hostile intent.”132 “Proportional” force used in self-defense
is force that is “sufficient to respond decisively,” but not exceeding the
“nature, duration, and scope” of what is required for defense.133 The
United States and other nations apply the principle of self-defense
throughout the spectrum of international politics—and the SROE
provides a guide for implementing the right of self-defense for small
units, such as a boarding team in a rigid hull inflatable boat, from a
surface combatant warship or a national asset, such as a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier or ballistic missile submarine. Thus, the use of force in
self-defense may occur at the tactical, operational, or strategic—even
global—level. For example, the imposition of the maritime quarantine
against Cuba in 1962 was based on the right of self-defense.134 The case
of the Cuban Missile Crisis quarantine illustrates that the exercise of selfdefense is not limited to cases involving an “actual armed attack.”
Myres S. McDougal suggests that “imminence of attack of such high
degree as to preclude effective resort . . . to non-violent modalities” has
“always been regarded as sufficient justification.”135
B. Security Council Enforcement Action—Al-Qaeda,
Iran, and North Korea
The U.N. Security Council may authorize MIO/VBSS against the
vessels of a particular state or organization under Article 41 of Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter.136 Security Council resolutions adopted under

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 126, at A-4.
133. Id. at A-5.
134. Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J.
INT’L L. 588, 597 (1963).
135. Id. at 597-598; see also MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW
AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION 229-244 (1961).
136. U.N. Charter, supra note 119, art. 41.
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Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter are binding on all nations.137 Article 41
provides Security Council authority for the “complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication. . . .”138 The provision may be
used to authorize the naval forces of member states to intercept vessels
and conduct VBSS as part of the mandate to take measures necessary to
“maintain or restore international peace and security.”139
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 217 of November 20,
1965, for example, authorizing the United Kingdom to enforce an oil
embargo against Rhodesia.140 The next year, the Security Council acted
again, calling on the United Kingdom to “prevent, by the use of force if
necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be
carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia. . . .”141 Resolution 221
authorized the use of force and characterized Rhodesia’s proclamation of
142
The so-called “Beira Patrol”
independence as a “threat to the peace.”
enforced economic sanctions against the apartheid regime in Rhodesia—
cutting off the supply of oil from reaching the country.
The burden for enforcing the Beira Patrol fell on Britain. The
Security Council action raised considerable challenges for crafting rules
of engagement for VBSS, but the strong political authority of the U.N.
action deterred states from supporting Rhodesia.143 There never was a
risk that Rhodesia’s two supporters—South Africa and Portugal—would
144
Since the end of the Cold War, the
forcibly challenge the blockade.
Security Council has acted on a handful of occasions to authorize states
to conduct VBSS in order to intercept shipping. In four separate cases,
the Security Council authorized the interdiction of vessels entering or
leaving Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Sierra
Leone.
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, U.N. Security
Council Resolution 661 imposed a general embargo on all trade with Iraq
or Kuwait as a means of inducing Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 660, requiring the withdrawal of Iraqi military forces
137. Id. art. 48.
138. Id. art. 41.
139. Id. art. 39.
140. S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/Res/217 (Nov. 20, 1965).
141. S.C. Res. 221, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/221 (Apr. 9, 1966).
142. Id. ¶ 1; S.C. Res. 232, ¶ 1, U.N. SCOR, 21st Year (Dec. 16, 1966).
143. D.P. O’CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 174 (1975).
144. See JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919-1979 126 (2nd ed. 1981); J.E.S.
Fawcett, Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 103, 109
(1965-66).
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145
Operating under the Chapter VII authority, a large
from Kuwait.
coalition of states used force against Iraq in response to Baghdad’s
August 2, 1990, invasion of neighboring Kuwait. Security Council
Resolution 665 imposed a blockade on Iraq on August 25, 1990, in order
146
Resolution 665 also provided authority for
to enforce Resolution 661.
states to “halt all inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to
inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations,” using authority under
Chapter VII of the Charter.147 During the conflict, coalition naval forces
conducted VBSS against vessels bound in and out of Iraq, diverting
numerous ships and seizing cargo that violated U.N. sanctions. It is not
clear whether these activities constituted a separate belligerent right of
visit and search under the law of armed conflict, but my view is that they
did not. Instead, the member states of the U.N. formed the coalition in
accordance with Security Council resolutions that authorized measures
on land and at sea in order to enforce an embargo against Iraq.
During the mid-1990s, the Security Council authorized additional
MIO missions authorizing visit and search of ships to enforce sanctions
against Yugoslavia (both the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [Serbia-Montenegro]).148 The
Security Council also authorized visit and search of vessels inbound for

145. S.C. Res. 661, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/0661 (Aug. 6, 1990); S.C. Res. 660, ¶ 2, U.N.
Doc S/RES/0660 (Aug. 2, 1990).
146. S.C. Res. 665, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/0665 (Aug. 25, 1990). Interestingly, Security
Council Resolution 665 requested states “cooperating with the Government of Kuwait” in
the blockade of Iraq to coordinate through the discarded mechanism of the Military Staff
Committee, which is described in Articles 46 and 47 of the UN Charter. Id. ¶ 4; U.N.
Charter, supra note 119, art. 46, 47. The coalition did not do so, however. YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 306 (4th ed. 2005).
147. S.C. Res. 665, supra note 146, ¶ 1; see also S.C. Res. 660, supra note 145
(“Security Council condemns Iraqi invasion of Kuwait”); S.C. Res. 661, supra note 145
(sanctions imposed on Iraq); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0662 (Aug. 9, 1990) (Iraq’s
annexation of Kuwait was “null and void”); S.C. Res. 664, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0664 (Aug.
18, 1990) (reaffirmed earlier Security Council resolutions); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/0665 (Aug. 25, 1990) (imposed restrictions on trade with Iraq); S.C. Res. 667,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/0667 (Sep. 16, 1990) (demand release of foreign nationals abducted by
Iraq); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0670 (Sep. 25, 1990) (air traffic restrictions); S.C.
Res. 674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0674 (Oct. 29, 1990) (collect information on Iraqi grave
breaches of the law of war); S.C. Res. 677, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0677 (Nov. 28, 1990)
(condemn Baghdad’s attempt to alter the demography of Kuwait and destroy Kuwaiti
government records).
148. S.C. Res. 787, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0787 (Nov. 16, 1992); S.C. Res. 820, ¶ 17,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/0820 (Apr. 17, 1993).
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149
and Sierra Leone in 1997.150 In Security Council
Haiti in 1992-93
Resolution 1132 of October 8, 1997, the nations of the Economic
Community of West African States were authorized to “prevent the sale
or supply to Sierra Leone . . . using their flag vessels or aircraft, of
petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related matériel of all
types. . . .”151 In Resolution 1132, the Security Council did not use the
term “VBSS,” but rather the synonymous terminology for nations to
“halt” inward maritime shipping and “inspect and verify” their
cargoes.152 More recently, in the era after the attacks of September 11,
2001, the Security Council acted to address the threat of terrorism and
the transportation of WMDs at sea. Resolutions concerning Al-Qaeda,
Iran, and North Korea provide the naval forces of U.N. member states
with authority to conduct VBSS in specific circumstances.

1. Al-Qaeda
It was clear after September 11, 2001, that in order to have relevancy
in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the threat against WMDs, the Security
Council would have to develop additional authorities aimed at securing
the world from accelerating proliferation of WMDs. The 2003 public
exposure of the nuclear proliferation network, run out of Pakistan by Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, provided further impetus for controlling WMDs.153
Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, in 2004 the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1540, which determined that the
“proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as
their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and
security.”154 Within the context of the resolution, “means of delivery”
includes “missiles, rockets, and other unmanned systems capable of
delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons . . . designed for
such use.” The Resolution also targets “related materials,” which it
defines as “materials, equipment, and technology covered by relevant
multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control
lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use
149. S.C. Res. 875, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0875 (Oct. 16, 1993); S.C. Res. 917, ¶ 10,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/0917 (May 6, 1994).
150. S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
151. Id. ¶ 6.
152. Id. ¶ 8.
153. See, e.g., William Langewiesche, The Wrath of Khan: How A. Q. Khan Made
Pakistan a Nuclear Power—and Showed That the Spread of Atomic Weapons Can’t Be
Stopped, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 62-85 (Nov. 2005).
154. S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
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of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of
delivery.”155
Four years later, Resolution 1810 was the next comprehensive nonproliferation resolution adopted by the Security Council.156 The
Resolution reaffirmed Resolution 1540, and reviewed progress toward
implementation of measures to prevent the proliferation WMDs and their
means of delivery. The Resolution extended the mandate of the
Resolution 1540 Committee for a period of three more years—until April
25, 2011.157 Resolution 1540 provided sweeping legal authority for
interdiction of WMDs and their delivery systems. In contrast, Resolution
1810 gauged the progress to date and sought to develop a baseline of
implementation by states by developing a program for provision of
technical expertise, “outreach, dialogue, assistance, and cooperation,” to
enhance coordination and implementation. In addition to the overarching
mandate contained in Resolutions 1540 and 1810, the Security Council
has struggled to adopt targeted authorities for interdicting ships at sea
that are engaged in supporting Iranian and North Korean WMD
programs.
2. Iran
The President of the U.N. Security Council issued a statement on
March 29, 2006, in which he noted concern over Iran’s decision to
resume uranium enrichment and its associated nuclear program research
and development, as well as Tehran’s suspension of cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) Additional Protocol.158 The Security Council
then called on Iran to follow through with the transparency measures
required by IAEA Board of Governors Resolution GOV/2006/14
concerning Iran’s implementation of the NPT.159 In that Resolution, the
Board of Governors deemed it necessary for Iran to take a variety of
measures to resolve “outstanding questions” and build confidence.160
These measures included a suspension of uranium enrichment and
reprocessing activities, including research and development, in a manner

155. Id.
156. S.C. Res. 1810, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1810 (Apr. 25, 2008).
157. Id. ¶ 6.
158. S.C. Pres. Statement 2006/15, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/15 (Mar. 29, 2006).
159. Id.
160. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 1, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006).
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that could be verified by the IAEA.161 The Board of Governors also
called upon Iran to ensure ratification and implementation of the full
NPT Additional Protocol, and comply with the instrument pending
ratification, which Tehran had signed on December 18, 2003.162 Finally,
the IAEA sought Iranian implementation of additional transparency
measures, providing access to individuals, documentation, and
laboratories inside the country.163 The transparency provisions extended
beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and the
Additional Protocol, but were requested personally by the IAEA Director
General.164
Four months after the adoption of Board of Governors Resolution
GOV/2006/14, with Iran still intransigent, the U.N. Security Council
stepped in. In July 2006, the Council adopted Resolution 1696, which
reiterated the call for Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board
of Governors in Resolution GOV/2006/14.165 The operative statutory
effect of Resolution 1696 was to make Iranian compliance with the
previous statement of the President of the Security Council legally
binding on Iran. Tehran still had not resolved “outstanding questions”
concerning its nuclear activities, and the Resolution demanded that Iran
suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and
stop further nuclear research and development.166 The IAEA was
authorized to verify the cessation of the prohibited activities.167 Tehran
dragged its feet. On December 23, 2006, the Security Council imposed
sanctions on Iran through Resolution 1737.168 Resolution 1737 further
required all states to take measures to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer
of items that could contribute to Iran’s civil or military nuclear
enrichment program.169
Shortly thereafter, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1747,
which also was decided under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. 170 Resolution 1747 demanded that Iran comply with the Board
of Governors Resolution GOV/2006/14, and mandated Tehran’s action
as “essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose” of
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
Id. ¶ 6.
S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006).
Id. ¶ 3.
S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
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its nuclear program.171 The Resolution also imposed a duty on all states
to use “vigilance and restraint” towards the movement of individuals
supporting Iran’s nuclear proliferation.172 It further decided that Iran is
not permitted to “supply, sell, or transfer” a range of prohibited
weapons.173
In 2008, the Security Council imposed additional restraints through
the adoption of Resolution 1803, which focused targeted trade
restrictions against Tehran for refusing to suspend its uraniumenrichment and heavy-water projects.174 Fourteen nations voted in favor
of Resolution 1803, and although no country voted against the
Resolution, Indonesia abstained.175 Jakarta, mindful of its geopolitical
reality as an archipelagic nation, is always wary of U.N. Security Council
authority extending throughout the oceans.
The Resolution bans shipment to Iran of major weapons systems,
such as armored battle tanks and warships, as well as the transfer of
ballistic missile technology into the country.176 The Resolution also
includes annexes identifying suspected Iranian individuals and
companies that should be shunned by the international community.177
Nations were required to ensure their financial institutions and banks,
including overseas branches, were not involved inadvertently in
providing capital investment in nuclear-related activities.178 Finally, the
Resolution authorized states to inspect cargo of aircraft and vessels to
and from Iran suspected of trafficking in proscribed materials and
weapons, conditional upon flag state consent.179 However, because states
already may board ships based upon flag state consent, the effect of the
provision is symbolic and political, rather than legally substantive.
3. North Korea
With the North Korean (DPRK) surprise attack on the Republic of
Korea (ROK) Navy Cheonan offshore patrol vessel on March 27, 2010,
171. Id. ¶ 1.
172. Id. ¶ 2.
173. Id. ¶ 5.
174. S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
175. Bureau of International Security and Proliferation, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1803 on Iran’s Nuclear Program (Apr. 4, 2008), http://merln.ndu.edu/
archivepdf/iran/State/102891.pdf.
176. Id. ¶ 8.
177. Id. ¶ 7.
178. Id. ¶ 10.
179. Id. ¶ 11.
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Security Council sanctions against DPRK have acquired new urgency.
For nearly two decades, the DPRK has publicly announced its intentions
to develop WMDs, including production of nuclear weapons. As a
member of the NPT, North Korea had signed a full-scope safeguards
agreement with the IAEA, as required by the treaty.180 But in a March
12, 1993 letter to the president of the Security Council, the DPRK
expressed an intention to withdraw from the NPT. On March 25, the
IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution calling on North Korea to
honor its existing obligations.181 Unable to verify whether DPRK nuclear
material had been diverted from peaceful use, the IAEA Board of
Governors found the reclusive nation in violation of its IAEA safeguards
agreement on April 1, 1993.182 The Security Council responded by
calling on Pyongyang to reconsider its announcement and honor its
commitment to non-proliferation pursuant to the treaty.183
North Korea engaged in ballistic missile tests on July 5, 2006. In
condemning the missile launches, the Security Council called on all
nations to prevent missiles and missile-related materials and technology
from supporting the DPRK’s missile and WMD programs.184 Resolution
1718 of October 14, 2006 called on all states to prevent the DPRK from
exporting any armaments included in a long list of conventional weapons
and WMDs, as well as luxury commercial goods.185 The latter
proscription was designed to impinge on the exuberant lifestyle of the
regime’s elite, bringing pressure to bear on the decision makers. The
Security Council mandate provides that nations should disrupt North
Korea’s nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and transfer of weapons of
mass destruction, as well as trafficking in armored battle tanks, armored
combat vehicles, large caliber artillery, combat aircraft and attack
helicopters, warships, missiles, and associated systems.186
On April 13, 2009, the President of the Security Council issued a
statement condemning a successful April 5 missile launch by North
187
Korea.
Six weeks later, on May 25, Pyongyang conducted its second
successful nuclear test. Soon afterward, on June 12, 2009, the U.N.
180. IAEA, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – IAEA: Agreement for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, IAEA DOC. INFCIRC/403 (May 1992), 33 I.L.M. 315.
181. Id. at 315.
182. Id.
183. S.C. Res. 825, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993).
184. S.C. Res. 1695, ¶¶ 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006).
185. S.C. Res. 1718, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
186. Id.
187. S.C. Pres. Statement 2009/7, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2009/7 (Apr. 13, 2009).
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Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 under Article 41 of Chapter
188
Resolution 1874 dictated that the DPRK
VII of the U.N. Charter.
must strictly comply with its obligations under the previous resolutions,
Resolution 1718 in particular, and abandon all nuclear activities
inconsistent with either the NPT or the Safeguards Agreement.189
Concerning interdiction, Resolution 1874 called upon all states to
inspect, all cargo to and from the DPRK that transits their territorial ports
or seas if a nation has reasonable grounds to believe cargo contains items
that promote the transfer or export of North Korea’s conventional or
WMD programs.190 If the flag state does not consent to an inspection of
cargo on the high seas, the Security Council directed that the ship should
191
proceed to a port for inspection at the pier. The transfer of armaments
from the DPRK is banned, and all imports of weapons into the DPRK are
192
to be halted, excepting certain small arms and light weapons. The new
regime institutes an enhanced maritime cargo inspection program, but
flag state consent is still required to conduct a VBSS.193 Once again, the
Security Council adopted peacetime enforcement measures. Because the
action is not predicated on a belligerent wartime right, the Resolution is
not an exercise of the belligerent right of visit and search. Instead, the
provisions constitute collective measures for the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security in accordance with Article
42 of the U.N. Charter.194
Resolutions 1718 and 1874 provide an overall framework that links
pre-existing international legal authorities together, binding the
foundational Resolution 1540 with the NPT, the Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, to compel North
Korea and Iran to abandon their pursuit of advanced weapons.195 In
addition to creating legal guidance, the resolutions and associated
instruments provide political cover for nations to enhance domestic
counter-proliferation authorities. This umbrella of political support is
188. S.C. Res. 1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009).
189. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
190. Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
191. Id. ¶ 13.
192. Id. ¶ 10.
193. Id. ¶ 12.
194. U.N. Charter, supra note 119, art. 42.
195. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800
(1993); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10,
1972, 11 I.L.M. 310 (1972).
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essential for nations that are more reticent about the use of force in world
politics. Tokyo, for example, relied on Resolution 1874 to develop ship
boarding authority for the Japan Coast Guard to be able to interdict North
Korean ships. On May 28, 2010, a coalition of lawmakers in the House
of Councilors of the Diet of Japan enacted a new law authorizing the
Japan Coast Guard to inspect ships suspected of carrying banned cargo
bound for or leaving North Korea.196 Previous efforts to pass such a law
had failed because they lacked bipartisan support. The new law,
however, was adopted in the wake of the Security Council Resolution
1874.

A Tale of Two Security Council Counter-Proliferation Regimes197
UNSCR 1874 (2009)
UNSCR 1929 (2010)
[North Korea]
•

•
•
•

•

Bans all arms transfers from
DPRK and all arms to DPRK
(except small arms & light
weapons)
Enhanced maritime cargo
“inspection” regime (but still
requires flag state consent)
No bunkering services
Asks states not to provide
grants, loans, or public
financial help IF it could
contribute
to
DPRK
proliferation efforts
Travel limitations

[Iran]
•

•
•
•

•

Bans major weapons systems
(i.e., tanks, warships, etc.)
transfers and ballistic missile
technology to Iran
High seas boarding based on
flag state consent
No bunkering services
Prohibits
Iranian
foreign
investment in nuclear-related
activities and provision of
financial services that support
Iran’s nuclear program
Travel limitations

196. Diet Enacts Law on N. Korean Cargo Inspection, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 27, 2010,
available at http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9FVJ5P00&show_article=1.
197. I am indebted to Capt. Raul “Pete” Pedrozo, JAGC, USN (Ret.), Professor of
International Law, U.S. Naval War College, who helped me develop and organize this
analysis.
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4. Regimes of the International Maritime Organization
The IMO is the U.N.’s specialized agency for maritime matters.
With 167 member states, the organization has produced approximately
fifty treaties and hundreds of codes and guidelines to enhance safety and
security at sea. The work conducted at the IMO affects flag, port, and
coastal states worldwide, and the regimes developed through the IMO’s
unique “spirit of cooperation,” which generally requires broad consensus
on issuance of new mandates, has done more to strengthen maritime
security than any organization besides the Security Council.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States
prompted a concerted response from the IMO, reflected in Assembly
Resolution A.924(22).198 In response to Resolution A.924(22), the Legal
Committee of the IMO began a comprehensive review of existing
maritime security treaties, and in particular the 1974 International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)199 and the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation.200 These two treaties formed the bedrock of
maritime security authority in international law. Additionally, the
asymmetric nature of the threat of Al-Qaeda inspired the member states
of the IMO to conduct a comprehensive review to see if the instruments
required updating. Both treaties were radically amended to meet the new
threats to maritime security.
First, SOLAS was strengthened in December 2002, when the
member states of the IMO adopted a new amendment regime to protect
ships and port facilities from terrorist attack.201 The revised SOLAS
incorporates a new chapter XI, which includes the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).202 The ISPS Code contains a
comprehensive framework for governments, the shipping industry and
198. IMO, Review of Measures and Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism which
Threaten the Security of Passengers and Crews and the Safety of Ships, IMO Assemb. Res.
A.924(22) (Jan. 22, 2002) (adopted Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://www.imo.org/
includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D24550/A924%2822%29.pdf.
199. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47,
1184 U.N.T.S. 2.
200. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201, 27 I.L.M. 668.
201. IMO, Conference Resolution 1: Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, IMO Doc.
SOLAS/CONF.5/32 (Dec. 12, 2002); IMO, Conference Resolution 2: Adoption of the
International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities, IMO Doc.
SOLAS/CONF.5/34 (Dec. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Conference Resolution 2].
202. Conference Resolution 2, supra note 201, at 2.
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port authorities to coordinate and manage, evaluate and improve
maritime security practices.203 The ISPS Code includes a mandatory
section (Part A),204 as well as a series of guidelines on measures to take
to implement the requirements in a second, non-mandatory section
(Part B).205 National maritime administrators should establish maritime
security levels and oversee implementation of the ISPS Code for vessels
flying their flag.
Ships entering the port of a state party should comply with the
security level established by the port authorities, if that level is higher
than the security level set by the flag state’s maritime administration. The
new regulations require all ships to develop a security plan approved by
the flag state and be outfitted with a security alert system.206 Once
activated, the security alert system transmits the alarm to designated
maritime authorities, identifying the ship and its location.207 The system
does not raise any alarm on board the ship, and it may be used to alert
shore side security of an unfolding threat, such as a ship under attack by
terrorists or pirates. The security alert system must be capable of being
activated from the navigation bridge and at least one other location on
board the ship so that it can be triggered surreptitiously.208 Although the
SOLAS amendments are critically important in developing a
comprehensive package of ship and port facility security measures for
the global maritime transportation system, the provisions do not directly
facilitate ship boarding. The 2005 Protocols to the 1988 Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA), however, establish the most comprehensive boarding
regime to date.209 The 1988 Convention is called the Achille Lauro
Treaty, because it was adopted in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the
Italian cruise ship.210

203. Id. at 6-7.
204. Id. at 4-30.
205. Id. at 31-91.
206. Id. at 11-13, 43-44.
207. IMO, Guidance on Provision of Ship Security Alert Systems, at 1, IMO Doc.
MSC/Circ.1072 (June 26, 2003).
208. IMO, Guidance on the Provision of Information for Identifying Ships When
Transmitting Ship Security Alert, at 1 n.3, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 1190 (May 30, 2006).
209. IMO, Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (Nov. 1, 2005).
210. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, supra note 200, para 3.
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C. Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation
In 2002, the member states of the IMO began work on a
comprehensive update of the original SUA or Achille Lauro Treaty of
1988. The remarkable story behind this effort dates back to 1985 when
the Italian-flagged cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked by Palestinian
terrorists, an episode that ended in the brutal murder of disabled
American Jewish passenger, Leon Klinghoffer.211 Many states did not
have criminal legislation for extradition or prosecution for the crime of
vessel hijacking. To fill this gap in the law, the year following the attack,
Austria, Egypt, and Italy proposed that the IMO prepare a convention to
facilitate law enforcement cooperation against ship hijackers.212 The
treaty provides a comprehensive set of rules to ensure close coordination
among states to extradite and prosecute individuals who committed a
number of capital crimes at sea, including seizure of a ship by force, acts
of violence on board ships, and placement of bombs on board a ship.213
Article 3 of the 1988 SUA created the offense of unlawfully and
intentionally seizing “control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any
other form of intimidation,” while Article 8 provides a mechanism for
flag states and vessel masters to deliver to the authorities of any state
party an individual suspected of committing an offense covered by the
Convention. The final treaty text became the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA), which was adopted by the IMO at a conference in
Rome in March, 1988, and entered into force on March 1, 1992.214
Today the SUA has 156 state parties.215 SUA commits member states to

211. Capture of Hijackers; 8 Americans Who Left Ship Before Hijacking Arrive Home, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/11/world/capture-of-hijackers-8americans-who-left-ship-before-hijacking-arrive-home.html?ref=leon_klinghoffer.
212. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, IMO (Nov. 11, 2011, 4:25 p.m.),
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx.
“In November 1986 the Governments of Austria, Egypt and Italy proposed that IMO
prepare a convention on the subject [of maritime security].” Id.
213. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, supra note 200, art. 3.
214. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, supra note 200.
215. IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the
International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or other
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criminalize the unlawful and intentional seizure or exercise of control
over a ship by force or threat.216 The treaty further provides that state
parties shall either prosecute a violation or extradite the suspect.217
The amendments to the 1988 SUA Convention unfolded between
2002 and 2005, resulting in development of two protocols—one that
applies to ships and the other that applies to fixed platforms on the
continental shelf. The 2005 Protocols concerning vessels adds a new
Article, 3bis, which commits states to criminalize the maritime
transportation of WMDs, and their components and means of delivery.218
The 2005 Protocol makes it an offense for a person to “unlawfully and
intentionally” commit acts that “intimidate a population” or “compel a
Government or international organization to do or abstain from doing
any act,” including: using explosives, or biological, nuclear or chemical
(BCN) weapons on or against a ship; using a ship in a manner that causes
death or serious injury or damage, and transporting on the ship explosive,
radioactive, or fissionable material or a BCN weapon that is intended to
be used for terrorism, including so-called “dual use” items that may have
a legitimate purpose, but nonetheless contribute “to the design,
manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon . . . .”219 Article 3ter creates
an offense for unlawfully and intentionally transporting on board a ship
someone known to be a terrorist.220 Article 3quarter creates an offense
for unlawfully and intentionally injuring or killing any person in
connection with one of the other offenses.221 The new article also
introduces inchoate crimes in this regard, including attempt, accomplice,
organizing and directing offenses, or contributing to the commission of
such crimes.222
A new Article 8bis creates a comprehensive framework for ship
boarding that may be utilized by one nation that seeks to board the ship
of another flag state. The ship boarding procedures in the 2005 Protocol
are comprehensive and detailed, calling on state parties to cooperate “to
the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress unlawful acts” covered

Functions, at 389-393 (Oct. 5, 2010), available at http://www.imo.org/About/
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20of%20Conventions%202010.pdf.
216. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, supra note 200, art. 3(1)(a), 5.
217. Id. art. 7(1).
218. IMO, supra note 209, art. 3bis.
219. Id. art. 3bis (1)(a), (b).
220. Id. art. 3ter.
221. Id. art. 3quarter.
222. Id. art. 3quarter (b)-(e).
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in the Convention.223 The procedures are triggered by one state having a
“reasonable grounds to suspect” that a ship or person on board the ship is
involved in one of the offenses identified in Article 3.224 First, a party
seeking to board the ship of another party should confirm the nationality
of the vessel. If the nationality is verified, then the state seeking to board
a foreign-flagged ship should request authorization from the flag state,
including asking for permission to execute specific measures, such as
stopping, boarding, or searching the ship or its cargo or persons on
board. The flag state has the option of authorizing the boarding,
conducting the boarding itself or in conjunction with the state making the
request, or declining the request for boarding.225
Original contracting states for the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA 2005):226
Country
Date of signature or
deposit of instrument
Cook Islands (accession)
12 March 2007
Dominican Republic (accession)
9 March 2010
Estonia (ratification)
16 May 2008
Fiji (accession)
21 May 2008
Latvia (accession)
16 November 2009
Liechtenstein (accession)
28 August 2009
Marshall Islands (accession)
9 May 2008
Nauru (accession)
29 April 2010
Saint Kitts and Nevis (accession)
29 March 2007
Spain (ratification)
16 April 2008
Switzerland (accession)
15 October 2008
Vanuatu (accession)
20 August 2008
The 2005 Protocols are significant in several ways. First, the treaty
expands the definitions of acts that constitute terrorism and transfers
them to the maritime context. Second, it includes perhaps the most
comprehensive international framework for countering the proliferation
of WMDs. Third, the boarding provisions provide an enforcement
223. Id. art. 8bis (1).
224. IMO, supra note 209, art. 8bis(4).
225. Id. art. 8bis (a), (b).
226. IMO, Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation: Entry into Force, at 2, IMO Doc. SUA.3/Circ.
11 (May 4, 2010).
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mechanism within a multilateral terrorism and counter-proliferation
treaty. The boarding provisions also contain safeguards to protect human
rights, and persons embarked on vessels that are boarded are to be treated
in accordance with international human rights law.227 Finally, states may
provide pre-approval of boarding of their ships by foreign-flagged
warships under some circumstances. Any flag state may submit a
declaration to the Secretary-General of the IMO authorizing boarding
and search of its vessels by another state when the other state has
reasonable grounds for believing that the ship or a person on board is
suspected of a covered offense. Flag states also may file a similar
declaration authorizing boarding of vessels of the flag state in cases
where the flag state does not respond within four hours to a request to
verify the registration of the vessel.228
V. CONCLUSION
With PSI, Resolution 1540, and the 2005 SUA Protocols, nations are
establishing a global, and increasingly effective, network of legal and
policy authorities to synchronize intelligence and operations against
terrorists and WMDs in the maritime domain. After five years, the 2005
SUA Protocols finally have entered into force. Although application of
the Protocols has gotten off to a disappointingly slow start, a large
number of additional ratifications would allow the SUA regime to gain
momentum and would help states to codify the deep and rich
collaboration already evident in the PSI into a formal international
framework. While the flexibility of PSI has been a hallmark of its
success, the lack of formal structure has made some nations—Malaysia
and Indonesia, for example—reluctant to fully participate. For all of the
groundbreaking and frankly astonishing success of PSI, some countries
are wary of its informal nature and process. Although there is value in
creating an interlocking network of formal and informal arrangements,
the SUA protocols may end up eclipsing PSI. The era of the “coalition of
the willing” may be coming to a close; the concept having been badly
bruised by the U.S. experience in Iraq. Consequently, more formal
multilateral arrangements, such as the SUA Treaty, now may generate
greater international support than informal and less transparent
initiatives.
If the 2005 amendments are to have a significant effect on
international cooperation, states must not only accede to them, but utilize
227. IMO, supra note 209, art. 8bis (10)(a)(ii).
228. Id. art. 8bis (5)(d).
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them. The original 1988 SUA Convention, although widely accepted, has
not played the role that it might have because states have neglected to
implement legislation or make political commitments to ensure that it
works. The shipping industry is especially hopeful that the 2005
amendments will attract widespread support. Shipping commerce is a
global industry, relying on a common framework of norms and regimes.
The industry can only operate efficiently when regulations applicable to
a particular ship are identical in the port of departure, on the high seas,
and in the port of arrival. Because PSI focuses on enlarging national
authorities rather than global rules, it is more likely to inadvertently
create a web of inconsistent national laws than would occur under the
international legal regime of SUA.

